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Private International Law (PIL) does not admit patrimony, usually considered as the 
totality of the property rights of a person, as an autonomous legal category. Whereas, 
within civil law systems influenced by Roman Law, at the domestic or internal level, 
patrimony is a recognised legal concept. But, actually, this unitary vision seems less and 
less stable owing to the adoption, within said systems, of some types  of negotiable 
instruments that are able to realise different forms of patrimonies. This article intends to 
underline how civl law systems are gradually affirming a divisional approach about the 
regulation of patrimony, as traditionally happens at the level of PIL rules. But at the same 
time, it aims at highlighting how, in particular, by recourse to the use of trusts, it is 
possible to recover both at the PIL and internal levels a unitary vision. 
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A. Introduction 
Patrimony is usually considered as the set of legal relations (assets and liabilities) of 
economic relevance belonging to a specific person or entity; it is not regarded by Private 
International Law (PIL) as an autonomous category, neither is it a criterion directed to solve 
the typical questions of conflict of laws concerning applicable law and jurisdiction. For this 
reason, at PIL level, the regulation of patrimony generally coincides with that of its individual 
assets: property, immovables, movables, contracts, torts, credits and debts. This is a direct 
consequence of the fact that, within the different national legal systems, legislators usually do 
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not value patrimony as a legal category1 but rather as a system category, as happens, for 
example, in other typical legal expressions such as good faith and public policy2 in respect to 
which the legislator does not provide a definition, preferring, on the contrary,  to leave this 
task to the courts and legal scholars.  
It was, above all, the doctrine of civil law systems to worry about reconstructing the 
patrimonial phenomenon, according to a unitary vision, for which patrimony was seen 
essentially as a manifestation of the legal personality of every legal subject in the world of 
economic relations. In this way, in each civil law system, there has been an identification of 
patrimony with the person of its holder, with the clear purpose to give a unitary regulation to 
the patrimonial assets of a person. Nevertheless, this approach has influenced the functioning 
of certain PIL rules, albeit limited to the sectors of succession and insolvency. In the first 
case, submitting succession issues to the national law or domicile of the deceased; in the 
second case, the location of the centre of the debtor’s main interests are usually linked to its 
‘headquarters’.  
But, the aforesaid unitary vision seems actually less and less stable due mainly to the rise 
of the phenomenon of economic and trade globalisation3 and of Europeanisation of PIL4 that 
 
1 Legal categories are usually central to legal reasoning. It is very difficult to imagine legal reasoning without the 
use of categories. Categorical thinking usually affects every area of law. See S A Alexander, “The 
Transformation of Trust as a Legal Category, 1800-1914” (1987) Law and History Review 303. 
2 Good faith and public policy are abstract and comprehensive terms used in many areas of the law. Good faith 
encompass a sincere belief or motive without any malice or the desire to defraud others while public policy are 
rules with different sources from which parties have no freedom to derogate. They are either created by States 
unilaterally to protect the fundamental values of their society, or they are created at the regional level, or even at 
an international-multilateral level. 
 3 See JH Dunning, Globalization of Firms and the Competitiveness of Nations (Lund University Press, 1990); M 
Baldassarri, L Paganetto, E S Phelps (eds) International Differences in Growth Rates: Market Globalization and 
Economic Areas (Palgrave Mac Millan, 1994); K Lynch, The Forces of Economic Globalization: Challenges to 
the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2003); T Berend, An Economic History Twentieth-
Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2006); D 
Rodrick, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth, (Princeton 
University Press, 2007); D Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investments Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
4 It is known that the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam substantially and controversially changed the EC Treaty and the 
changes that affected the field of PIL are known as ‘The Europeanisation of PIL”. This phenomenon can be seen 
as a process whereby the European Community and now the European Union has been given legislative powers 
to create PIL rules through Art 81 TFEU (ex Art 65 TEC). This concerns jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and rules of applicable law; in short all PIL traits. For further details see J Basedow, 
“The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under The Treaty of Amsterdam” (2000) 37 Common Market 
Law Review 687; P Pocar, “La comunitarizzazione del diritto internazionale privato: una ‘European Conflict of 
Laws Revolution’?” (2000) 36 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 873; A Bonomi, “Il diritto 
internazionale privato dell’Unione europea: considerazioni generali, in A Bonomi (ed), Diritto internazionale e 
cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile (Giappichelli, 2009) 1; V Van Den Eeckout, “The Instrumentalisation 
of Private International Law - Quo Vadis? Rethinking the ‘Neutrality’ of Private International Law in an Era of 
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has given a great impulse to the growing of the so-called Market of legal rules5 for which 
every legal system produces different legal techniques for the solution of a given problem and 
within the said market the law suppliers can meet the need of the law consumers. 
States, in order to attract more foreign investors and to avoid capital flight and the 
migration of its own entrepreneurs to other countries (normally, characterised by lower labour 
costs and taxes), often open their legal systems to legal values and principles and to new types 
of negotiable instruments developed elsewhere. In this way, they try to adapt themselves to 
the requirements of market players. It is the case that many EU civil law countries have  
introduced, over time, ideas from common law countries into their legal systems eg new 
forms of contracts, like leasing, factoring, joint venture and project financing,6 and legal 
institutions, like trusts, hitherto unknown to their culture and belonging to that other most 
important legal tradition in the world. 
Particularly, thanks to the influence exercised by trusts within civil law systems in recent 
years, a more widespread variety of negotiable instruments have been introduced, like the 
Italian atto di destinazione, the Spanish acto costitutivo del par las personas con 
discapacidad, the French contrat de confiance, and San Marino’s contratto di affidamento 
fiduciario (see  infra).  Thus, we observe within the EU continental systems the increase in a 
different perspective in the management of patrimony, more precisely: a divisional approach, 
for which diverse property rights, belonging to the patrimony of the same physical or legal 
person, can be separated from each other, to satisfy different economic purposes of their 
owner, considered worthy of protection by the relevant national legal order. In other words, 
there is the creation of different forms of patrimonies potentially submitted to distinct legal 
 
Globalisation and Europeanisation of Private International Law”, in J S Bergé, S Franco and M Gardenes 
Santiago (eds), Boundaries of European Private International Law (Bruylant 2015) 387. 
5 See R A Posner, “Creating A Legal Framework for Economic Development” (1998) 13 The World Bank 
Observer 3; U Mattei, “Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics” (1994) 
3 International Review of Law and Economics 12; S Woolcock, The Single European Market: Centralization or 
Competition among National Rules? (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994); HW Sinn, Competition 
between Competition Rules, (1999) 7273 National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 2-36; W Andy, 
“Public Sector Accounting–Democrat Accountability or Market Rules?” (2004) 24 Public Money and 
Management 5; R Cotter, Il mercato delle regole, (Il Mulino, 2006). 
6 An important role concerning the diffusion of leasing and factoring, that had their origins in the Anglo Saxon 
systems, was played by the Unidroit Convention on international leasing and on factoring (Ottawa, 28 May 
1988). For comment see H Rosen, Leasing Law in the European Community (Euromoney Publications 
PLC,1991); A Knebel, Der Aufwendungsersatzanspruch des Leasinggebers nach der Unidroit-Leasing 
Konvention (Peter Lang, 1994); F Ferrari, Il factoring internazionale: commento alla convenzione uniudroit sul 
factoring internazionale (Cedam, 1999); D Leistner and A Barbara, Internationales Factoringeine 
rechtsvergleichende Darstellung zum Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankreichs und der Vereinigten 
Staaten unter Einschluss der UNIDROIT-Konvention uber das Internationale Factoring (1988): mit 
Vertragsmustern, FCI-Vorschriften und dem Text des Ubereinkommens vom 28 Mai 1988, (C.H. Beck, 1992). 
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disciplines at an internal level, rather than the whole patrimony being treated in the same way.  
Thus, in civil law systems, the establishment of the divisional approach about the 
management of patrimony, characterises not only the functioning of their PIL rules (with the 
exception, before cited, of succession and insolvency), but above all of their substantive rules. 
However, in the PIL case, the divisional approach consists of breaking patrimony up into its 
components, recognising each of them as a specific discipline with their own connecting 
factors (such as the situs of the immovable property or the place where the contract is made or 
the place where a tort is committed); on the contrary, at an internal level, the divisional 
approach consists of establishing various pools of patrimonial assets, each one devoted to 
realising different aims and to guaranteeing special categories of creditors. 
In addition, it is important to underline that the possibility of submitting patrimony in some 
civil law systems (at PIL and internal level) to a unitary solution is not excluded thanks to the 
recourse to the legal institution of a trust. This institution was unknown in civil law systems 
until the entry into force of the Hague Convention of 1985 on the law applicable to trusts and 
on their recognition.7 The conflict rules contained in that international instrument have the 
primary purpose of enabling the recognition of the trust and its legal effects within each 
Contracting State, if the trust has been constituted under the law of a State which admits it and 
to which the settlor has made reference in the corresponding constituting act. 
Particularly, the Hague Convention allows the settlor to put all his patrimonial assets in a 
trust which is subject to one law only (see Articles 6-8). So, that instrument could appear to 
be the tool to recover both at internal and PIL level, as we will see infra, a unitary 
management of patrimony, in a historical moment characterised by the rise of different figures 
of patrimonial assets. 
 
B. Patrimony in private international law 
 
7 Concluded on 1 July 1985. Entry in force on 1 January 1992. The full text of the convention is available at the 
web site of the Hague Conference at the page http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59  
(accessed on 12 June 2017). The Convention is in force for 14 States including the following civil law States: 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Panama and Switzerland, see 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=59 accessed 25 July 2018.  For an analytical 
comment see A E von Overbeck, Explanatory Report on the 1985 Hague Trusts Convention (HCCH 
Publications, 1985) and HCCH, Proceedings of the Fifteenth Session (1984)-Trusts, Applicable Law and 
Recognition (HCCH Publications 1985); J Harris, The Hague Trusts Convention: Scope, Application and 
Preliminary Issues (Hart, 2002); L Fumagalli, La Convenzione dell’Aja sul trust e il diritto internazionale 
privato italiano (1992) 42 Diritto del Commercio Internazionale 533; F Albissini, R Gambino, “The Italian Civil 
Law System and The Hague Convention on Trust” (1993) 2 Journal of International Trust and Corporate 
Planning 73; J P Beraudo, “La convention de la Haye du 1er juillet 1985 relative à la loi applicable au trust et à 
sa reconnaissance” (1985-1986) Travaux du comité francais de droit international privé 21. 
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Private International Law (PIL) is usually considered that part of a national legal system 
which comes into operation when a court is faced with a claim that contains a foreign 
element. It is only when this factor is present, that PIL has a function to perform. Firstly, to 
fix the conditions under which the court is competent to entertain such a claim. Secondly, to 
establish for each class of cases the specific system of law by reference to which the rights of 
the parties must be determined. Thirdly, to specify the circumstances in which a foreign 
judgment can be recognised as decisive in the question in dispute and the right vested in the 
judgment creditor by a foreign judgment can be enforced by action in a specific country. 
As regards patrimony, we have already noted how it is not usually considered by PIL to be 
an autonomous legal category nor a legal criterion directed to solve problems of conflict of 
laws. This is likely due, on the one hand, to the lack of a definition of patrimony and, on the 
other hand, to the natural variability of its composition as regards quantitative and qualitative 
assets during the lifetime of its owner. Thus, PIL traditionally prefers to break patrimony 
down into its basic components: property, immovables, movables, contracts, torts, credits and 
debts. In this way, each of these elements is submitted to a specific applicable law and, 
perhaps is the subject of a special jurisdiction rule. It follows further that we may have 
different patrimonial assets each one submitted to a different applicable law. So, it is 
impossible to discuss, prima facie, about a law and a forum of patrimony taken as a whole. 
Therefore, as patrimony is not inserted into the group of legal categories directly considered 
by PIL, the traditional problem of characterisation does not arise.8  
In contrast, from the point of view of substantive law, in civil legal systems, scholars have 
been discussing for a long time the legal nature of patrimony and its functions. Essentially, 
under those systems, two different positions can be identified: the subjective9 and the 
 
8 The question of characterisation, sometimes referred to in English as “classification” (Beckett was the first to 
suggest that classification was linguistically a better term in English than qualification, see “The Question of 
Classification Qualification in Private International Law” (1934) 15 British Yearbook of International Law 46) 
of the cause of action, means the allocation of the question raised by the factual situation before the court to its 
legal category. Its object is to reveal the relevant rule for the choice of law. The rules of any given system of law 
are arranged under different categories some being concerned with status, others with succession, procedure, 
contract, tort and so on and until a judge, faced with a case involving a foreign element has determined the 
particular category into which the question before him falls, he can make no progress for he will not know what 
choice of law rule to apply. He must discover the true basis of the claim being made.   
9 See C Aubry and C Rau, Cours de droit civil francais (Marchal et Billard, 1839); P Cazelles, De l’ideè de 
continuation de la personne comme principe des transmissions universelles (Rosseau,1905); F S Bianchi, Corso 
di diritto civile (Turin, 1886) 3-15; G Bonelli, La teoria della persona giuridica (1910) 2 Rivista di diritto civile 
498, 614; H Gazin, Essai critique sur la notion de patrimoine dans la doctrine classique (Rosseau, 1910); J P 
Vershave, Essai sur le principe de l’unitè du patrimoine (Anrt, 1985) 190; G Ripert, Les forces creatrices du 
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objective theory.10  
For the first opinion, patrimony must be considered only as a unique and unitary entity, 
coinciding with the person of its holder. For the second, patrimony is a legal unitary entity 
able, on the one hand, to be submitted to property or other right and, on the other hand, to be 
transferred by inter vivos and mortis causa negotiable instruments. Under both doctrinal 
positions patrimony essentially is aimed at guaranteeing the creditors of its holder. 
However, as we will see, due to the introduction of new forms of contracts and other 
negotiable instruments in some continental European countries (above all in Spain, Italy and 
France), a dynamic approach has emerged that is able to break down patrimony into different 
patrimonial assets, each one submitted to different regulations. It is the case of the cited 
contrat de fiducie11 introduced into the French civil code in 2007 or patrimonio di 
destinazione12 inserted into the Italian civil code in 2006 and of other more specific forms of 
patrimony like the Spanish regulacion del patrimonio protegido par las personas con 
discapacidad approved in 2003 and devoted to the economic protection of people affected by 
disabilities,13 or to the San Marino contratto di affidamento fiduciario by which a person 
manages another person's patrimony, in the interest of a third person with the effect that the 
patrimonial assets, submitted to his management, do not overlap with his own patrimonial 
assets. 
These legal innovations are characterised by a common feature: to favour the separation of 
general patrimony of a person, in a manner which is possible for the same person to hold 
different patrimonial assets, each one finalised to the satisfaction of a specific economic 
 
droit (Rosseau, 1995).  
10 See R Gary, Les notions d’universalité de fait e d’universalitè de droit (Sirey, 1932) 303; R Schmidt, 
Burgerliches Recht (Allgemeiner Teil, 1952); H Lange, Sachenrecht, (Tubingen, 1967) 38-42; J Carbonnier, 
Droit civil (Paris, 1967) 70; N Coviello, Manuale di diritto civile, (Società editrice libraria, 1929) 252; P 
Rescigno, Manuale di diritto privato italiano, (Utet, 1977) 442. 
11 See G Bellargent, ‘L’introduction de la fiducie en droit francais par la loi du 19 fevrier 2007’ (2007) 58 Revue 
juridique de l'économie publique 359; Y Emerich, ‘Les fondements conceptuels de la fiducie française face au 
trust de la common law: entre droit des contrats et droit des biens’ (2009) 1 Revue internationale de droit 
comparé 49. 
12 See G Peroni, “La norma di cui all’art. 2645-ter: nuovi spunti di riflessione in tema di trust” (2006) 20 Diritto 
del Commercio Internazionale 575; A Morace Pinelli, Atti di destinazione, trust e responsabilità del debitore 
(Giuffrè, 2007); F La Rosa, Patrimoni e finanziamenti destinati ad uno specifico affare: ottica destinazione, 
ottica separazione; analisi delle prospettive di sviluppo e dei profili di rischio connessi ai nuovi strumenti di 
federalismo patrimoniale finanziario (Giuffrè, 2007); M Indolfi, Attività ed effetto nella destinazione dei beni, 
(Giuffrè, 2010); M Astone Destinazione di beni allo scopo: fattispecie ed effetti (Giuffrè, 2010).  
13 See M M Azcano, El patrimonio protegido de las personas con discapacidad: aspectos civiles, (La Ley, 2011); 
P E Tortajada, El patrimonio protegido de las personas con discapacidad, (Tirant lo Blanch, 2012); A Quesada 
Sanchez, “El discapacidado y su patrimonio protegido” (2008) 75 Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo y Asunto 
Sociales 187. 
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interest. It follows that the traditional function of guarantee recognised to patrimony is 
destined to change. 
In fact, on assets that form that specific patrimony, only those who result to be creditors 
against the holder of said specific assets (by virtue of assumed obligations for the realization 
of the specific aim to which those assets are intended) can be satisfied.  In other words, the 
guaranteed function is not only limited to a restricted group of creditors but, at the same time, 
specifically oriented to the satisfaction of specific interests, appreciated by the legal order, 
such as those described before. It happens, independently, from the traditional function of 
recognized patrimony: to guarantee the creditors of its holder, in the event of the non-
performance of an obligation or of other breaches of legal duty. This approach clearly shows 
the opening of the continental legal orders to the cited dynamic vision about the management 
of patrimonial assets, no longer inspired by a static conception of patrimony, for which a 
physical or legal person can be the holder of only one patrimony. 
 
C. The notion of patrimony according to the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ theories, their 
influence on civil law systems: a comparison with common law 
 
To understand the role that patrimony can perform within Private International Law according 
to the perspective of Civil Law, it is useful, first of all, to remember that it constitutes a 
system category and not a legislative category. In other words, patrimony does not receive a 
precise legislative notion by any rule contained in any legal order. This is usually a conscious 
decision of each lawmaker that prefers to delegate to doctrine and case law the task to 
develop, specify and integrate the above definition. In this way, each legal system acquires 
more flexibility adapting itself to new concepts and requirements emerging as time elapses. 
The so called subjective theory, elaborated by Aubry and Rau, had a significant success in 
defining patrimony These scholars, in their handbook Le Cour de droit civil francais, clearly 
affirmed : 
l’idée de patrimoine se déduit directement de celle de la personnalitè… le patrimoine est, 
en principe, un et indivisible comme la personnalité meme…le patrimoine est l’émanation 
de la personalité et l’expression de la puissance juridique dont une personne se trouve 
investie comme telle.14 
 
14 See Aubry and Rau supra n 9, 133. 
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In a nutshell, according to Aubry and Rau’s theory, patrimony may be defined as the set of 
legal relations (assets and liabilities) of economic relevance belonging to a particular person 
or entity. Thus, patrimony is a manifestation of the legal personality of every legal subject 
within the world of economic relations. In these terms, the principle of unity that inspires the 
subjective theory finds a full realisation, thanks, above all, to the identification of patrimony 
with the person of its holder. 
On the basis of the subsequent developments that have influenced the subjective theory 
other scholars15 have made important conclusions. First, a patrimony without a holder is 
inconceivable and, at the same time, it is not plausible that the same person could possess 
more than one patrimony. Second, patrimony, as a single entity, is transferable only mortis 
causa and not inter vivos (by contract of sale or any other negotiable instrument). This occurs 
essentially for two reasons: first, there is not, unlike what happens for contracts and credits, a 
general negotiable instrument by which it is possible to transfer patrimony from one person to 
another; second, the need to ensure the continuity of legal economic relations belonging to a 
person is usually considered with regard only to the event of the death of a person or his 
bankruptcy. 
The theory in question has succeeded in having a fundamental influence on the 
development of legal culture, in many civil law countries, regarding the complex discipline of 
patrimony. This is true, even if the subjective theory has been contradicted by some positive 
law provisions, in particular those relating to vacant succession16 and inheritance with benefit 
of inventory17 from which we get the admissibility of the existence of patrimonial assets 
without a specific individual holder. In other words, the separation of patrimonial assets is not 
absolutely prohibited in civil law systems, even if only in specific and exceptional 
circumstances, strictly defined by each national legislator. Consequently, individuals are not 
allowed to create different forms of separate patrimonies, apart from those mentioned, at the 
 
15 See F Galgano, “Struttura logica e contenuto normativo del concetto di persona giuridica”, (1965) 5 Rivista di 
diritto civile 553; E J Cohen, C Simitis, “Lifting the veil in the company laws of European continent” (1963) 12 
International and Comparative Law Quaterly 183; A Seriaux, “La notion juridique du patrimoine. Breves 
notations civilistes sur le verbe avoir » (1994) 93 Reveu Trimestrelle de Droit Civile 801; J A Doral Garcia, “El 
patrimonio como instrumento tecnico juridico” (1983) 36 Anuario de derecho civil 1269. 
16 The vacant succession makes reference to succession where an estate has suffered failure. A vacant succession 
occurs not only when an estate is vacant, but also when an heir having possession of an estate refuses to 
administer it. Vacant successions are administered by legal representatives and they are known as administrators 
of vacant successions. 
17 The benefit of inventory requires all executors or other administrators of the estate of a deceased to make an 
inventory of the estate and to pay all debts of the estate before distribution to the beneficiaries. It also gives them 
the opportunity of ascertaining the net value of the estate before accepting it.  
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expense of their private autonomy.  
However, at the present time, the more recent civil law doctrine,18 following the dynamic 
approach described before, considers that patrimony should not necessarily be identified with 
the person of its holder, nor be considered only as a unique legal entity, but rather it may 
articulate itself in different ways on the basis of the aim that the respective holder intends to 
pursue through the different ways in which his assets are held. This method is receiving 
particular attention in civil law systems, for example, through the introduction of the cited 
French contrat de fiducie19  and the Italian atto di destinazione.20 Thanks to these new legal 
concepts, we note a significant effect for which the unitary idea of patrimony, that is at the 
basis of the subjective and objective theories before analysed, in those systems, gives way, at 
least at their internal level, to a divisional approach in regards to the management of 
patrimony.  
On the contrary, a different situation characterises common law systems in which we note 
the traditional absence of a unitary approach to patrimony.21 This is due, probably, to many 
reasons. First of all, in the English language there is not a specific word that designates the 
conceptual equivalent of Italian and Spanish Patrimonio or French Patrimoine or German 
Vermogen. In other words, English uses the expression ‘patrimony’ above all for 
convenience, but actually that word does not have the same meaning as in the civil law 
tradition. In fact, in this last case, it makes reference to all personal and real entitlements, 
including movable and immovable property, belonging to a natural or a legal person – a 
notion that, only partially, coincides with the common law concept of a person's estate. 
This linguistic element is absolutely relevant, as the absence of an equivalent word 
 
18 See L M Lo Puky, ‘The Death of Liability’ (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 1; A M Patault, ‘La personne morale 
d’une nationalisation à l’autre, naissance et mort d’une théorie’ (1993) 17 Droits 79; F Santoro-Passarelli, 
Dottrine generali del diritto civile (Jovane, 1986) 85; S Guinchard, L’affectation des biens en droit privé 
français (L.G.D.I.,1976) 330. 
19 The French civil code defines the fiducie as a contract according which a settlor transfers all or part of its assets, 
rights or securities to a fiduciary that, in maintaining them separately from its own patrimoine, acts according to 
a specific objective for the benefit of its beneficiaries or the settlor itself. The fiducie amounts to a temporary 
transfer of ownership: the assets transferred to the fiduciary are no longer part of the settlor’s assets. The latter 
loses any right of ownership with regard to those assets. The only remaining right is a “droit personnel de bonne 
exécution du contrat de fiducie” a contractual duty set out in the contract itself. The assets affected to the fiducie 
enter the fiduciary’s patrimoine, in which they will constitute a distinct pool of assets. 
20 This legal institute is included in the Art 2645 ter of the Italian civil code and it is similar to the contract of 
fiducie even if the Italian legislator never uses the word fiducie or other linguistic term that can make direct 
reference to the experience of a trust. By the atto of destinazione, the settlor establishes the bond of destination 
engraved on goods, in order to achieve an interest worthy of protection, leading to segregated liability. 
21 In these terms see L Smith, “Trust and patrimony” (2009) 28 Estates, Trusts and Pensions Journal 332; G. 
Gretton,‘Trust and Patrimony’, in H MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of W A 
Wilson (Sweet and Maxwell, 1996) 182. 
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represents an index expressing a different thought about the legal category in question that is 
inevitably the result of another social and cultural vision. Traditionally, in fact, the Anglo-
Saxon system is influenced by a liberal and pragmatic approach,22 including the way law is 
typically conceived, ie where everything that is not forbidden is possible.23 
Through the establishment and wide use of trusts24 in common law systems the idea has 
spread that it is possible to conceive ‘in the hands’ of a person not only a general patrimony, 
but many and different ‘pools’ of assets, each one with its own legal autonomy and 
regulation.  
 
D. The unitary vision of patrimony and conflict of laws in civil law countries 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have observed how, in civil law systems, the principle of unity 
has inspired, for a long period, the regulation of patrimonial assets. At the same time, we have 
underlined how at the roots of the principle of unity there is a static vision of patrimony 
closely dependent on guaranteeing the generality of creditors of the holder, in the event of the 
non-performance of an obligation, or of other breaches of legal duty.   
However, the principle of unity has played a different and plainer role as regards to the 
regulation that patrimony traditionally receives at the level of national rules characterising 
PIL of civil systems. In the context of the PIL of succession civil law countries have usually 
adopted a unitarian approach which states that the law of succession is the law of the 
deceased’s citizenship or habitual residence and that a single legal system governs the 
worldwide estate.  
 
22 The emphasis on pragmatism has deep cultural roots. Particularly, some authors suggest this relates to the fact 
that Britain has never been subject to the kinds of external constraints which have resulted in a more rationalist 
approach to politics in other countries. For example, Britain has never had to justify its political system from 
‘first principles’ like the American founding fathers or rebuild its constitutional framework following defeat in 
war as Germany had to do following the Second World War. See G Gutting, Pragmatic liberalism and the 
critique of modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
23 See A V Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth 
Century (Liberty Fund, 2008); P Birks, “Adjudication and Interpretation in the Common Law: A Century of 
Change”, (1994) 14 Legal Studies 156; J Beatson, “Has the Common Law a Future?” (1997) 56 The Cambridge 
Law Journal 291; M Hale, History of Common law in England (University Press of Chicago, 1971). 
24 On the origins of trusts and its evolution see J Story, Commentaries on equity Jurisprudence (Sweet & 
Maxwell,1920) 393; M A Badre, Le developpement historique des uses jusq’à l’introduction du trust en droit 
anglis (Rousseau,1932) 13; F W Maitland, Equity. A Course of Lectures (Cambridge, 1936) 23; C Hamson and 
T Plucknett, The English Trial and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 1952); M Lupoi, Appunti 
sulla real proprerty e sul trust nel diritto inglese (Giuffrè, 1971), W F Fratcher, “Trust”, in International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Property and Trust (Tubingen, 1973) 84. 
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This unified solution, however, does not exclude the application of other conflict of laws; 
this may happen, in particular, with regard to the case of real estate for which it will often be  
necessary to make reference to the lex situs to fulfil the publicity requirements required by the 
land register connected to the acquisition of immovable property that is part of the 
inheritance. 
On this specific aspect, we can note how, in particular, Italian, Spanish, German, Austrian 
and Dutch national systems of international private law have resorted to the principle of unity 
by which questions relating to intestacy or wills are governed by one single law, namely the 
personal law of the deceased, even before the recent adoption of the EU Succession 
Regulation (650/2012) which affirmed the unity principle.  
In common law systems, succession matters are submitted to the principle of scission. As a 
consequence, the destination of movables on the death of the owner is governed by the law of 
his domicile, whilst the destination of immovables is governed by the law of the situs. 
Consequently, the immovable estate of the deceased is divided up according to where the 
immovable is situated and distributed according to the various leges situum. 
From what we have said so far, it results that, within civil law systems, there is a 
discrepancy between substantive and internal PIL rules about the regulation of patrimony. In 
PIL patrimony, with the exception of succession and insolvency that adhere to the principle of 
unity, falls under the principle of divisibility. In PIL, patrimony continues to be considered 
according to its singular elements: movable, immovable, torts and contracts; each one subject 
to its own specific PIL rules. 	
E. Trusts: A possible contact point between unitary and divisional approaches in the 
management of patrimony? 	
Briefly, it is important to remember that a trust has many important features. This is true, 
in particular, in cases where the property holder is a fiduciary who must have full title to the 
property under administration as opposed to some lesser right, such as possession, detention 
or factual control. The fiduciary has full title or the ability to take full title of trust property 
only when that property is free from the claims of the trustee’s personal creditors. The last 
point depends on the fact that, on the basis of an in rem characterisation of his rights or of his 
entitlement to reinstate the trust, the beneficiary is able to trace the trust property into the 
hands of a false trustee or into the hands of a third party. 
From these brief evaluations, we can understand how in common law systems, a trust has 
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the intrinsic capacity ‘to break the right of property’, in the so-called dual ownership (the 
ownership of the trustee and the ownership of the beneficiary), while in civil law, owing to 
the numerus clausus of rights in rem25 property is traditionally considered as a unique legal 
entity. Thanks to this, in common law countries, a trust allows the creation of different 
patrimonial assets held by the same person, each one devoted to the realisation of a specific 
aim. 
This is an effect of the dynamic vision of patrimony, examined previously, that is at the 
basis of trust and its different uses in Anglo-Saxon systems. But, while the dynamic idea of 
patrimony inspired common law systems from the institution of trust in the Middle Ages, the 
opening of civil law to this vision is recent and is due to various reasons.  
First, due to the phenomenon of economic and trade globalization we can see tough 
competition amongst States in attracting foreign direct investments. In fact, only a legal 
system capable of admitting different forms of segregation of assets can be attractive for 
investors, usually worried about losing their money from the attack of creditors of the holders 
of the patrimony in question.  
Second, thanks to the adoption in 1985 of the Hague Trusts Convention26 this concept cam 
eto the attention of those countries where the trust concept was unfamiliar.  
Third, in 1989 the EU adopted Directive 667 on single-member private limited-liability 
companies.27 By this act, the EU, for the first time, stated it was important “to provide a legal 
instrument allowing the limitation of liability of the individual entrepreneur throughout the 
Community, without prejudice to the laws of the Member States which, in exceptional 
circumstances, require that entrepreneur to be liable for the obligations of his undertaking.” In 
other words, it becomes admissible for a company to “have a sole member when it is formed 
and also when all its shares come to be held by a single person (single-member company).”28 
So, from that moment the individual entrepreneur has the capacity to separate the fate of their 
personal assets from that relating to their individual business. 
 From that time, we note the adoption within EU legal systems of rules created to admit 
different forms of patrimony, usually devoted to the realisation of a specific aim and 
 
25 It is a principle present in most part of civil law countries which implies that one may only create rights in rem 
which fall within one of the types already prescribed by the law. 
26 See supra n 7. 
27 Directive 89/667/EEC [1989]  OJ L395/40. 
28 See Art 2 of the Directive. 
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characterised by the creation of a segregation of patrimonial assets belonging to the same 
subject: this is the case of the quoted French contrat de fiducie, the Italian atto di destinazione 
or the Spanish acto costitutivo del patrimonio protegido par las personas con discapacidad. 
In truth, all these legal concepts represent, at the internal level, sui generis forms of trust.29 In 
other terms, these are legal instruments that have been designed by civil law countries to 
make their legal systems more competitive and attractive for foreign investors within the so-
called market of legal rules30 where usually the Anglo-Saxon system stands out for its 
versatility making London, despite Brexit, the financial capital of Europe. 
So, thanks to the recourse to the trust, we gather instead the opportunity to submit 
patrimony, at PIL level, to a unitary discipline by virtue of the Hague Convention of 1985. In 
fact, this international instrument allows settlors to put forward all their patrimonial assets 
under only one law, including the case where the settlor holds the function of trustee and also 
the role of beneficiary. In these terms, in order to identify the applicable law, we have to 
consider particularly Article 6 of the Convention, according to which: “A trust shall be 
governed by the law chosen by the settlor. The choice must be express or be implied in the 
terms of the instrument creating or the writing evidencing the trust, interpreted, if necessary, 
in the light of the circumstances of the case.”  
However, the recourse to trusts in civil law systems for submitting patrimony to a unitary 
governance at the PIL level presents some limits and obstacles. The Hague Trusts Convention 
is in force for only 14 States,31 with the effect that the idea of giving form to a figure of 
international trust is likely to remain a ‘dead letter’ in many civil law States. 
Secondly, according to its Article 4, the Hague Convention does not apply to preliminary 
issues relating to the validity of wills or of other acts by virtue of which assets are transferred 
by the settlor to the trustee. In this way, the profiles concerning the validity of the acts by 
which the trust is established and the transfer of assets to the trust is made, shall be submitted 
to the law of the State of the competent court. This inevitably involves a coordination between 
the law applicable to the act by which it achieves the transfer of assets to the proper law of the 
trust identified on the basis of the rules established by the Convention. 
 
29 Because, as the trust, they create a separate patrimony both with reference to that of the settlor, both 
administrator and beneficiary. 
30 See supra note n 5. 
31 Australia, Canada, China (Hong Kong only), Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, Panama, San Marino, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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So, it is not possible to operate an absorption of preliminary issues32 within the law 
applicable to the trust, with the effect that the institution of trust and the possible 
reconstruction of patrimony in unified terms can be frustrated. 
 
F. Conclusion 
 
In civil law systems the meaning of patrimony as a legal concept is contested. The doctrine 
was traditionally influenced by the followers of the unitary and static approach and more 
recently by a divisional and dynamic approach in the regulation of patrimonial assets. These 
different approaches to the concept of patrimony have had significant effects on its regulation 
in internal law and in PIL: substantive law largely unitary and PIL largely divisional.  
However, recent regulatory changes to substantive rules in some continental countries 
favoured the rise at internal level of a divisional method due to a dynamic conception of 
patrimony with the effect that any person (natural or legal entity) may be a holder of various 
patrimonial assets and not just a single patrimony. But, this phenomenon does not preclude 
the possibility of bringing patrimony to a unitary regulation both at the level of internal 
substantive rules and PIL, thanks to the use of trusts in accordance with the Hague 
Convention. 
It could be useful to classify PIL rules on patrimony according to a single criterion in order 
to overcome the different positions previously described with reference to the management of 
patrimony. 
The recourse to the criterion of the domicile of the holder of patrimony could be the 
optimal olution.33  Domicile is the place where a person has his/her principal residence to 
which he/she returns or intends to return in order to manage his/her patrimonial assets and 
serves to reveal a close and stable connection with a legal order. 
Obviously, the aim to identify at PIL level a uniform regulation of patrimony according to 
the criterion of domicile is difficult to realise. Essentially, it is due to the absence of a uniform 
 
32 As we know, determining and solving the preliminary question is often necessary to resolve the principal 
question. In an international context, one can apply the lex fori's or the lex causae's PIL to determine the law 
applicable to the preliminary question. Traditional advantages of the lex causae approach lose their cogency in 
the EU context, the deterrence of forum shopping, the presumption of the closer connection and the international 
harmony. On the other hand, many traditional and new reasons support the lex fori approach: national harmony, 
foreseeability, practicability and further integration. See S Goessl, “Preliminary Questions in EU Private 
International Law” (2012) 8 Journal of Private International Law 63. 
33 Domicile is what is termed in PIL as a connecting factor which connects an individual with a system of law for 
the purposes of determining a range of matters, principally related to his status or property. 
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concept of domicile in a number of legal systems (to civil lawyers in Europe who do not 
apply common law, it means essentially habitual residence, while at common law it is a fairly 
complicated legal concept linked largely to where a person intends to live indefinitely) and 
the traditional resistence of States to give up control of the economic sphere of their citizens 
and firms. Nonetheless, an extension of the use of the domicile criterion could have a 
significant benefit in terms of legal certainty and predictability of the legal results. 
So, while waiting for the standardising of as much as possible of the various systems of 
PIL according to the domicile criterion, the technique through which a shared regulatory 
system in the governance of patrimony could be achieved, might be represented by the so-
called method of harmonisation.34 This means the use of connecting factors characterising a 
particular legal matter in their intrinsic reasonableness. In other words, according to this 
scheme, every legal issue in private law should be governed by the law of the place or country 
with which the issue is most closely connected. That, in this context, suggests taking into 
account the traditional function of patrimony: to guarantee the holder’s creditors according to 
the principle of non-discrimination35 on the basis of their nationality.  
This option is probably the best solution, in the absence of a global legal system inspired 
by domicile. Considering that harmonisation, although it is not at all synonymous with 
unification,36 is a method capable of coordinating the different private law systems in the 
 
34 The cited method has its roots in the theory of Savigny (1779-1861). In his most famous book, System des 
heutigen römischenRechts (System of Modern Roman Law), published in 1849, he asserted that a legal issue in 
private law should be governed by the law of the place or country with which the issue is most closely 
connected. He called such place its principal place (Sitz) or home country. According to him, each community 
has its own private legal system based on its own value system, which is independent from the interests of the 
sovereign state. Therefore, we can apply an appropriate foreign private law to the problem at issue. In order for 
an issue to be dealt with appropriately, we should apply the law that has the closest connection with the issue, 
which is the law of the home country. If the same law is chosen to apply to issues in accordance with choice-of-
law rules in every country, the differences in the content of the laws of countries do not matter at all. In this way, 
Savigny’s method can achieve the objective of private international law that is to bring order to a cross-border 
legal situation. 
35 The principle of non-discrimination is part of private international law that deals with choice of law. However 
the general principle of equality before the law may be tolerant towards multilateral conflict rules, but the 
position will be different where specific rules of non-discrimination are at stake or where the rules of PIL 
concerned have a substantive content. On this point, see K Lipstein, Harmonization of Private International Law 
by the E.E.C. (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,1978); P Kinsch, “Choice of Law Rules and the Prohibition 
of Discrimination Under the European Convention on Human Rights, Nederlands International Privaatrecht“ 
(2011) 1 University of Luxembourg Law Working. 
36 There are conflicting opinions on the differences in meaning of the terms: harmonisation and unification. In any 
event, as we observed above, these expressions are not synonymous. Particularly, Goldstein clarified that the word 
harmonisation “... suggests a functional unification which, however, is less than textual unity” (see S Goldstein, On 
Comparing and Unifying Civil Procedural Systems, Butterworth Lectures 1994, (Butterworths, 1995) 28. With 
reference to the evolution of the term harmonisation in Private International Law, see P Borba Casella, “Economic 
Integration and Legal Harmonisation with Special Reference to Brasil” (1998) Uniform Law Review 287; A Rosett, 
“Unification, Harmonisation, Restatement, Codification and Reform in International Commercial Law” (1992) 40 
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interests of justice and certainty for those involved in transnational activities or relationships, 
even if the satisfaction of said goals can be frustrated by divergences existing within the rules 
adopted in the different countries. 
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